收藏！2019年巴菲特致股东信中英对照版
美东时间2019年2月23日早8点（北京时间23日晚9点），巴菲特旗下伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway）发表一年一度的致股东信。雪球用户@价值博士于北京时间凌晨两点翻译完毕，以下为完整内容中英文对照版。
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东：
Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.
基于公认会计原则（通常称为“GAAP”），伯克希尔在2018年获得了40亿美元的收益。 该数字的组成部分为营业利润248亿美元，无形资产减值产生的30亿美元非现金损失（几乎完全来自我们对卡夫亨氏的股权），28亿美元的出售投资证券实现的资本收益以及我们投资控股中存在的未实现资本收益减少损失206亿美元。
A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as “wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.”
新的GAAP规则要求我们在收入中包含上述最后一项。 正如我在2017年年度报告中强调的那样，伯克希尔的副主席查理芒格和我都不相信这条规则是明智的。 相反，我们俩都一直认为，在伯克希尔，这种按市价计价的变化会产生我所说的“净利润的疯狂而反复无常的波动”。
The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by 41%.
我们在2018年的季度业绩表明了该预测的准确性。在第一和第四季度，我们分别报告了11亿美元和254亿美元的GAAP损失。在第二和第三季度，我们则报告了120亿美元和185亿美元的GAAP收益。与这些波动形成鲜明对比的是，伯克希尔拥有的众多业务在各个方面都实现了持续和令人满意的营业收益。 今年的营业利润超过2016年的176亿美元高点约41％。
Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That’s because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly $173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of $2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a “profit” or “loss” of more than $4 billion.
季度GAAP收益大幅波动将不可避免地继续下去。 这是因为我们庞大的股票投资组合 - 在2018年底价值接近1730亿美元 - 通常一天的价格波动将会高达20亿美元或更多的，新规则将使其立即影响到我们的净利润。事实上，在第四季度，股票价格高位震荡的时期，我们经历了几个单日“利润”或“损失”超过40亿美元的日子。
Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.
我们的建议？专注于营业利润，减少关注任何品种的浮动损益。我这样说并非是否定伯克希尔这些投资的重要性。随着时间的推移，查理和我预计他们将获得可观的收益，尽管时间非常不规律。
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Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice.
我们年度报告的长期读者会发现我打开这封信的不同方式。 近三十年来，最初的段落描述了伯克希尔每股账面价值的百分比变化。 现在是放弃这种做法的时候了。
The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.
事实上，伯克希尔账面价值的年度变化 - 这是其在第2页上的告别演出 - 是一个失去其曾经拥有的相关性的指标。有三种因素使得如此。首先，伯克希尔逐渐从一个资产集中在可销售股票的公司转变为其主要价值在于经营业务的公司。查理和我预计这一转型将会以不定期的方式继续下去。其次，虽然我们持有的股权按市场价格计算，但会计规则要求我们记录在公司账面价值中的部分远低于这些经营公司的当前价值，这一差异在近年来日趋增长。第三，很可能 - 随着时间的推移 - 伯克希尔将成为其股票的重要回购者，交易将以高于账面价值但低于我们估计的内在价值的价格发生。回购的数学影响很简单：每笔回购交易都会使公司每股内在价值上升，但是每股账面价值却会因此下降。上述因素的共同作用将导致账面价值记分卡越来越与我们的经济现实脱节。
In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.
在未来的财务报告中，我们期望聚焦于伯克希尔的市场价格。 市场可能非常反复无常：只需看看第2页列出的54年历史。然而，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的股价将提供最佳的业绩衡量标准。
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Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.
在继续之前，我想给你一些好消息 - 真正的好消息 - 这些都没有反映在我们的财务报表中。 它涉及我们在2018年初所做的管理变革，当时Ajit Jain负责所有保险活动，而Greg Abel则获得了所有其他业务的权力。 这些行动早就应该实施了。 伯克希尔现在管理得比我独自监督运营时要好得多。 阿吉特和格雷格拥有罕见的天赋，伯克希尔的血液流经他们的血管。
Now let’s take a look at what you own.
现在让我们来看看你拥有的东西。
Focus on the Forest – Forget the Trees专注于森林 - 忘记树木
Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic “trees,” so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.
评估伯克希尔的投资者有时会对我们众多不同业务的细节 - 我们的经济“树木”有所顾忌。 考虑到我们拥有大量的标本，从树枝到红木，对这种类型的分析可能是令人头脑麻木的。 我们的一些树木病了，可能在今后十年逐渐死去。 然而，许多其他树木注定会在规模和美丽两方面茁壮成长。
Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five “groves” of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.
幸运的是，没有必要单独评估每棵树以粗略估计伯克希尔的内在商业价值。 那是因为我们的森林包含五个重要的“树林”，每个树林都可以以合理的准确度进行评估。 其中四个是易于理解的差异化企业和金融资产集群。 第五个 - 我们庞大而多样化的保险业务 - 以不太明显的方式为伯克希尔提供了巨大的价值，我将在本函后面解释。
Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.
在我们更仔细地研究前四个树林之前，让我提醒一下您在资本配置中的首要目标：购买全部或部分具有良好和持久经济特征且由有能力的管理层经营管理的企业。我们还需要以合理的价格购买这些企业。
Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.
有时我们会购买符合我们要求的公司的控制权。 更常见的是，我们在公开交易的公司中发现符合我们要求的公司，这时我们通常会购买5％到10％的股权。 我们双管齐下的大规模资本配置方法在美国企业中很少见，但这给我们带来了重要的优势。
In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about $43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only $19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions.
近年来，我们要遵循的合理做法是明确的：许多股票为我们的资金提供了远超通过购买整个企业所获得利益。这导致我们在去年购买了约430亿美元的可销售股票，而仅售出190亿美元。查理和我相信我们所投资的公司提供了极好的价值，远远超过了整体收购交易的价值。
Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire’s forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned $16.8 billion last year. When we say “earned,” moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead.
尽管我们最近增加了许多可出售的股票，伯克希尔森林中最有价值的树林仍然是伯克希尔控制的许多非保险业务（通常拥有100％的所有权，从不低于80％）。这些子公司去年为我们赚了168亿美元。此外，当我们说“赚”时，我们描述的是扣除所得税，利息支付，管理费用（无论是现金还是期权），重组费用，折旧，摊销等费用之后的净利润。
That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature “adjusted EBITDA,” a measure that redefines “earnings” to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.
我们的净利润与华尔街银行家和企业首席执行官经常吹捧的净利润相去甚远。很多时候，他们的演示文稿都是在用“调整后的EBITDA”来重新定义“净利润”，这样做可以排除各种实际成本。
For example, managements sometimes assert that their company’s stock-based compensation shouldn’t be counted as an expense. (What else could it be – a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybe last year’s exact rearrangement won’t recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business – Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so.
例如，管理层有时会声称其公司的股票薪酬不应计入费用。 （还有什么可能 - 来自股东的礼物？）重组费用也不用？ 好吧，也许跟去年完全一样的重组不会再发生。 但是，这种或那种重组在企业中很常见 - 伯克希尔已经实施过几十次这样的重组，我们的股东一直承担着这样做的代价。
Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: “If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does it have?” and then answered his own query: “Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.” Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street.
亚伯拉罕·林肯曾经提出这样一个问题：“如果你把狗的尾巴称为腿，它有多少条腿？”然后他给出了自己的答案：“四条腿，因为称尾巴为一条腿并不能使它成为一条腿。”他在华尔街将会感到孤独。
Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of $1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization “costs” to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks.
查理和我确实认为，我们与收购相关的14亿美元的摊销费用（详见第K-84页）并不是真正的经济成本。 因此当我们评估私营企业和可销售股票时，我们会将这种摊销“成本”加回到GAAP收益中。
In contrast, Berkshire’s $8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those “maintenance” capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record $14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.
相比之下，伯克希尔的84亿美元折旧费低估了我们的真实经济成本。 事实上，我们需要每年花费超过这笔金额才能在我们的许多业务中保持竞争力。 除了那些“维护”资本支出之外，我们还花费大量资金来追求增长。 总体而言，伯克希尔去年在工厂，设备和其他固定资产方面的投资达到创纪录的145亿美元，其中89％用于美国。
Berkshire’s runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly $173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about $14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.
按价值计算，伯克希尔第二重要的树林是我们的股票组合，这通常涉及一些大型公司5％至10％的股权。 如前所述，我们的股权投资在年底时价值接近1730亿美元，远高于其成本。 如果我们在年终将整个投资组合出售，则将需要支付约147亿美元的联邦所得税。 很有可能，我们将持有这些股票中的大部分很长一段时间。 然而，最终，收益在出售时都需要以届时的税率缴纳税收。
Our investees paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as an indicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.
我们所投资的公司去年向我们支付了38亿美元的红利，这笔款项将在2019年继续增加。但是，比股息更重要的是这些公司每年保留的巨额收益。下面我们来看看我们最大五个持股的保留收益数据。
Yearend Company Ownership
American Express 17.9%
Apple 5.4%
Bank of America 9.5%
Coca-Cola 9.4%
Wells Fargo 9.8%
Berkshire’s Share in $ millions of Dividends(1)
$ 237
$745
$551
$624
$809
Total $2,966
Retained Earnings(2)
$ 997
2,502
2,096
(21)
1,263
Total $6,837
(1) Based on current annual rate.
(2) Based on 2018 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.
GAAP – which dictates the earnings we report – does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us.
GAAP - 它决定了我们报告的净利润 - 不允许我们将被投资方的留存收益包括在我们的财务报表中。 但这些留存收益对我们来说具有巨大的价值：多年来，我们的被投资者（被视为一个集团）保留的收益最终为伯克希尔带来了资本收益，这些公司为我们再投资的每一美元都赚取了总计超过一美元的资本增值。
All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee’s stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire’s ownership percentage.
我们所有的主要股票都拥有出色的经济效益，而且大部分都使用部分留存收益来回购股票。 我们非常喜欢这样：如果查理和我认为被投资公司的股票价格被低估，那么当管理层将其部分收益用于增加伯克希尔的所有权比例时，我们感到高兴。
Here’s one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire’s holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire’s portion of the $6.9 billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about 96% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners – over time – usually do well.
以下是上表中的一个例子：伯克希尔持有的美国运通在过去八年中保持不变。 同时，由于公司的回购，我们的所有权从12.6％增加到17.9％。 去年，伯克希尔公司在美国运通公司赚取的69亿美元中所占的份额为12亿美元，约占我们为公司股权支付的13亿美元中的96％。 当收益增加和股票发行量减少时，股东 - 随着时间的推移 - 通常收益也会很好。
A third category of Berkshire’s business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses – 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J – totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018.
第三类伯克希尔公司的业务是我们与其他方共享控制权的四方公司。 我们在这些业务中的税后营业利润享有的金额为— Kraft Heinz的26.7％，Berkadia和德州电力传输的50％，以及飞行员J的38.6％ — 在2018年总计约13亿美元。
In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another $20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer.
在我们的第四个树林，伯克希尔在年底持有1120亿美元的美国国库券和其他现金等价物，以及另外200亿美元的杂项固定收益工具。 我们认为该树林的一部分是不可动用的，比如已承诺始终持有至少200亿美元的现金等价物以防范外部灾难。我们还承诺避免任何可能威胁我们保持缓冲的活动。
Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.
伯克希尔将永远是一个金融堡垒。 在管理方面，我会犯下昂贵的交易错误，也会错过很多机会，其中一些对我来说应该是显而易见的。 有时，随着投资者逃离股票，我们的股票将会下挫。 但我永远不会冒现金短缺的风险。
In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.
在未来几年，我们希望将大部分过剩流动资金转移到伯克希尔将永久拥有的业务中。 然而，眼前的前景并不乐观：对于拥有良好长期前景的企业来说，价格是天价。
That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I’m the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie’s to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)
令人失望的现实意味着2019年可能会再次扩大我们持有的可出售股票。 不过，我们继续希望进行大象收购。 即使在我们88岁和95岁的年龄 - 我是更年轻的 - 这种前景正是导致我和查理的心跳加快的原因。 （只是写下大量购买的可能性就已经导致我的脉搏飙升。）
My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.
我购买更多股票的期望并不是号召大家入市。 查理和我不知道下周或明年的股票表现如何。 这种预测从未成为我们投资活动的一部分。 相反，我们的想法是专注于计算有吸引力的业务的价值是否比市场价格更高。
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I believe Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities.
我相信伯克希尔的内在价值可以通过将我们四个资产树林的价值相加，然后减去最终出售有价证券的所得税款来估算。
You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.
您可能会问，如果我们出售某些全资企业，Berkshire也将承担税务成本而且不能获得补贴？ 忘记这个想法：即使不缴纳任何税款，我们出售任何一家出色的公司也是愚蠢的。 真正好的企业非常难找。 出售任何你有幸拥有的东西都是毫无理由的。
The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire’s fifth grove – a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds “float,” a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free – or maybe even better than that – over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter.
在计算伯克希尔非保险业务的收益时，我们所有债务的利息成本已被作为费用扣除。除此之外，我们购买前四个树林的大部分所有权所需要的资金都来自伯克希尔第五个树林 - 一系列特殊保险公司。 我们将这些资金称为“浮存金”，这是我们期望随着时间的推移无成本 - 或者甚至可能更好 - 的融资来源。 我们将在本函后面解释浮存金的特征。
Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire’s value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.
最后，一个关键点在于：我们通过将五个树林组合成一个单一实体而将伯克希尔的价值最大化。 这种安排使我们能够无缝，客观地分配大量资金，消除企业风险，避免孤立，以极低的成本为收购资产提供资金，偶尔利用税收效率，并最大限度地减少管理费用。
At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.
在伯克希尔，整体比部分的总和更大，可以说大很多。
Repurchases and Reporting回购和报告
Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.
早些时候我提到伯克希尔将不时回购自己的股票。假设我们以低于伯克希尔的内在价值购买 - 这当然是我们的意图 - 回购将使离开公司的股东和留下的股东都能受益。
True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That’s because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire’s stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.
诚然，回购的好处对于那些离开的人来说非常轻微。这是因为我们的谨慎购买将最大限度地减少对伯克希尔股票价格的影响。然而，卖方在市场上有额外买家总归是有一些好处的。
For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner’s interest at, say, 90 on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is value- destructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.
对于继续持有的股东而言，优势显而易见：如果市场将离开股东的每一美元定价为90美分，那么继续持有的股东在每次回购时都会获得每股内在价值的增加。显然，回购应该是对价格敏感的：盲目购买定价过高的股票具有价值破坏性，然而这却是发生在许多乐观CEO身上的事实。
When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.
当一家公司表示它打算进行回购时，为所有股东提供他们所需的信息以进行明智的价值估算至关重要。提供这些信息是查理和我在本报告中尝试做的事情。我们不希望合伙人将股票出售给公司，因为他或她被误导或未充分了解情况。
Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.
然而，一些卖家可能不同意我们的价值计算，而其他卖家可能已经发现他们认为比伯克希尔股票更具吸引力的投资。第二组中的一些是正确的：毫无疑问，许多股票将比我们的股票带来更大的收益。
In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it’s time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.
此外，某些股东决定是时候让他们或他们的家庭成为净消费者而不是继续积累资本。查理和我目前没有兴趣加入这个团体。或许在我们晚年我们会成为大卖家。
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For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.
54年来，我们在伯克希尔的管理决策都是从留下来的股东的角度出发的，而不是那些离开的人。 因此，查理和我从未专注于当前季度的结果。
Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire’s overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.
事实上，伯克希尔可能是财富500强中唯一一家没有编制月度盈利报告或资产负债表的公司。 当然，我经常查看大多数子公司的月度财务报告。 但查理和我只在每季度了解一下伯克希尔的整体收益和财务状况。
Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly “number” to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.
此外，伯克希尔没有公司范围的预算（尽管我们的许多子公司都发现预算是有用）。我们缺乏这样的工具意味着母公司从未有过季度“数字”目标。避免使用这个向我们的众多经理发出了重要信息，强化我们所尊崇的文化。
Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.
多年来，查理和我看到过了各种财务及运营方面的不良企业行为，这些都是由管理层为满足华尔街预期所引发的。这些都是从为了不让“华尔街”失望而进行“无罪的”篡改开始的 - 比如说，在季末的渠道压货，对保险损失上升视而不见，或者提取“饼干罐”储备 - 可能会变成迈向全面欺诈的第一步。只玩一次这样的数字游戏或许是CEO初衷，但最终结果很少是这样。如果老板可以稍微作弊，那么下属很容易认为类似的行为是合理的。
At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.
在伯克希尔，我们的观众既不是分析师也不是评论员：查理和我正在为我们的股东合作伙伴工作。汇报给我们的数字将是我们发送给您的数字。
Non-Insurance Operations – From Lollipops to Locomotives非保险业务 - 从棒棒糖到机车
Let’s now look further at Berkshire’s most valuable grove – our collection of non-insurance businesses – keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-51.
现在让我们进一步了解一下伯克希尔最有价值的树林 - 我们非保险业务的集合 - 请记住，我们不希望向竞争对手提供可能对他们有用的信息。有关各个业务的更多详细信息，请参见第K-5至K-22页和K-40至K-51页。
Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of $20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain.
作为一个集团，这些企业在2018年的税前净利润为208亿美元，比2017年增长24％。我们在2018年的收购只带来了微不足道的收益。
I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater – 47% – thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let’s look at why the impact was so dramatic.
在此的讨论中，我会坚持用税前数字。 但是，我们2018年从这些业务中获得的税后收益的涨幅要远高于税前，高达47％ - 这在很大程度上要归功于年初生效的公司税率消减。让我们来看看为什么影响如此戏剧性。
Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government “owns” an interest in Berkshire’s earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country’s Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock – call this holding the AA shares – that receives large “dividends” (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury’s “stock,” which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government.
从经济现实开始：无论喜欢与否，美国政府“拥有”伯克希尔的一部分权益，其比例由国会决定。 实际上，我们国家的财政部持有我们一种特殊类别的股票 - 称之为持有AA股票 - 并从伯克希尔获得大量“股息”（即税收）。 2017年，与多年前一样，企业税率为35％，这意味着财政部的AA股表现非常好。 事实上，财政部在我们1965年接手伯克希尔时没有支付任何费用的“股票”，在过去几十年里已经发展成为每年向联邦政府提供数十亿美元的控股权。
Last year, however, 40% of the government’s “ownership” (14/35ths) was returned to Berkshire – free of charge – when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our “A” and “B” shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares.
然而，去年，当公司税率降至21％时，40％的政府“所有权”（14/35）被免费退还给伯克希尔。 因此，我们的“A”和“B”股东的股票收益大幅增加。
This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds.
这种情况实质上增加了你和我拥有的伯克希尔股票的内在价值。此外，同样的因素还增加了伯克希尔几乎所有持股的内在价值。
Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable.
这些是关键因素。但还有其他一些因素使得我们的收益受到不利影响。例如，我们的大型公用事业运营所带来的税收优惠需要传递给客户。同时，适用于我们从国内公司获得的大量股息的税率几乎没有变化，约为13％。 （这种较低的利率一直是合乎逻辑的，因为我们的被投资者已经为他们向我们支付股息的利润交过税了。）但总的来说，新法律使我们的业务和我们拥有的股票更有价值。
Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned $9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-45.
这表明我们恢复了非保险业务的表现。我们在这个树林里的两个高耸的红杉是BNSF和Berkshire Hathaway Energy（拥有90.9％）。合并之后，他们去年的税前利润为93亿美元，比2017年增长了6％。您可以在K-5-K-10页和K-40-K-45页上阅读更多关于这些业务的信息。
Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of $6.4 billion, up from the $5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.
我们接下来的按收益排名靠前的五家非保险子公司（这里按字母顺序排列）分别为：Clayton Homes，International Metalworking，Lubrizol，Marmon和Precision Castparts，他们在2018年的税前利润总额为64亿美元，高于在2017年获得的55亿美元。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from $2.1 billion in 2017.
再接下来的五家公司（Forest River，Johns Manville，MiTek，Shaw和TTI）去年的税前利润为24亿美元，高于2017年的21亿美元。
The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had pre-tax income of $3.6 billion in 2018 vs. $3.3 billion in 2017.
伯克希尔拥有的剩余非保险业务 - 有许多 - 在2018年的税前利润为36亿美元，而2017年为33亿美元。
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【因雪球文字不可超过20000字，因此全文发表在挖优狗网站，详见文末链接地址。】
The Annual Meeting年会
Berkshire’s 2019 annual meeting will take place on Saturday, May 4th. If you are thinking about attending – and Charlie and I hope you come – check out the details on pages A-2 – A-3. They describe the same schedule we’ve followed for some years.
伯克希尔2019年年会将于5月4日星期六举行。 如果您正考虑参加 - 而查理和我希望您的到来 - 请查看第A-2页 - A-3页上的详细信息。 他们描述了我们多年来遵循的相同时间表。
If you can’t join us in Omaha, attend via Yahoo’s webcast. Andy Serwer and his Yahoo associates do an outstanding job, both in covering the entire meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities, financial experts and shareholders from the U.S. and abroad. The world’s knowledge of what goes on in Omaha the first Saturday of every May has grown dramatically since Yahoo came on board. Its coverage begins at 8:45 a.m. CDT and provides Mandarin translation.
如果您不能加入我们的奥马哈，请通过雅虎的网络直播参加。 Andy Serwer和他的雅虎员工在报道整个会议和采访美国和国外的许多伯克希尔经理，名人，金融专家和股东方面做得非常出色。 自雅虎加入以来，世界对每年五月第一个星期六在奥马哈发生的事情的了解已经大大增加。 它的报道始于CDT时间上午8:45，并提供普通话翻译。
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For 54 years, Charlie and I have loved our jobs. Daily, we do what we find interesting, working with people we like and trust. And now our new management structure has made our lives even more enjoyable.
54年来，查理和我都喜欢我们的工作。 每天，我们做我们感兴趣的事情，与我们喜欢和信任的人合作。 现在，我们新的管理结构使我们的生活更加愉快。
With the whole ensemble – that is, with Ajit and Greg running operations, a great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash-generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock-solid culture – your company is in good shape for whatever the future brings.
整个公司 - 也就是说，在Ajit和Greg的运营下，大量优秀的业务，充裕的现金流状况，一批才华横溢的管理者和坚如磐石的文化 - 您的公司无论未来如何都处在一个良好状态之中。
February 23, 2019 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
2019年2月23日Warren E. Buffett董事会主席
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